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Different forms of inequality, resulting from anthropogenic environmental changes, constitute a 
large part of the environmental problems. Environmental benefits and harms are not distributed 
equally across and within national boundaries. Such benefits and harms are unevenly distributed 
within and between generations. The environmental harms are caused by our current practices and 
will afflict our future generations, while benefits are enjoyed by the present generations alone. The 
concepts of “sustainability” and “sustainable development” have been developed to address such 
problems of inter-generational equality. The concept of sustainability began its career in the context 
of sustainable agriculture and sustainable ecological system. Any account of sustainability must 
answer questions about what should be sustained, for whom it is to be sustained and why. In the 
mainstream economic literature, the answer to the first questions is a certain level of human welfare 
which is understood as preference satisfaction. This definition leads to the further questions as to 
what is required for such maintenance of this level of human welfare over time. The main aim of 
this article is to discuss these entire problems and provide some possible solutions to overcome this 
challenge positively. 
 






The dictionary meaning of the word 
“sustainability” is “keep going continuously”, 
“involving the natural products and energy in a 
way that does not harm the environment”. 
Thus, sustainable development would mean 
continuous development in harmony with 
nature. The concepts of “sustainability” and 
“sustainable development” have become 
centrally important in environmental 
discourse. These concepts were mainly used in 
the context of sustainable economic 
development. In 1987, the world Commission 
on Environment and Development, chaired by 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, said: “Sustainable 
development is development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their 
needs” [1]. In spite of its emphasis on the 
problems of inter-generational equity, two 
crucial notions arose out of this report: 




a) the essential needs of the world’s poor and 
b) the idea of limitation imposed by the state 
of technology and social organization on 
environment’s ability to meet present and 
future needs. 
 
The main objectives of the study are to discuss 
the concept of sustainability in the context of 
sustainable agriculture and sustainable 
ecological system. Any account of 
sustainability must answer questions about 
what should be sustained, for whom it is to be 
sustained and why. In the mainstream 
economic literature, the answer to the first 
question is a certain level of human welfare 
which is understood as preference satisfaction. 
This definition leads to the further questions as 
to what is required for such maintenance of 
this level of human welfare over time. The 
main aim of this article is to discuss these 
entire problems and provide some possible 







The terms “sustainability” and “sustainable 
development” are used regularly in 
environmental discourse like the policy 
documents of governmental agencies and 
business corporations. Such usage of the terms 
has generated suspicion in the sense that by 
juxtaposing “development” or “growth” with 
“sustainability” one can very well hide the 
possibilities of conflicts between continued 
economic growth and environmental goals. 
However, the term “sustainable” has led many 
thinkers to ask questions about what it is 
supposed to mean: the sustainability of what, 
for whom and why? Welfarist tradition of 
economic sustainable development claims a 
particular economic and social development 
that maintains minimum level of human 
welfare. Thus, sustainable development 
“becomes equivalent to some requirement that 
well-being does not decline through time” [2]. 
 
There are some assumptions involved in this 
characterization of sustainable development as 
a domain concept of human well-being:  
1. The first one highlights what is required for 
the maintenance of a certain level of human 
welfare over time. Welfare economists 
assume that well-being consists in the 
satisfaction of preferences.  
2. The second assumption concerns as to what 
is required for the maintenance of a certain 
level of human welfare which is formulated 
in the language of capital. It holds that the 
maintenance of a certain level of human 
welfare across generations requires each 
generation to leave a stock of capital assets 
which should be no less than it receives. In 
other words, the capital wealth or the 
productive potential should be constant or 
at least should not decline over time. This is 
known as the criterion of the constancy of 
total capital. 
 
Wilfrid Beckerman criticizes the concept of 
sustainable development. He points out that if 
sustainability is defined in terms of equitable 
distribution at a point of time and also, over 
time, then the concept scarcely adds any new 
dimension to the distributional considerations 
entertained in welfare economics. Moreover, 
the important question is: how is this concept 
relevant to environment and environmental 
sustainability? [3]. In response to such 
objections supporters of sustainable 
development maintain that this concept is 
required in economics since it insists on the 
important role of particular states of the 
natural world for the welfare of future 
generation, and this position is stated in terms 
of capital. Thus, a distinction has been made 
between natural and manmade capital which is 
the source of two types of sustainability 
requirements: 
 
1. Weak sustainability: the requirement that 
overall capital, consisting of both natural 
and manmade capital, should not decline 
(this is known as the constant total capital 
view), or 
2. Strong sustainability: that natural capital 
should not decline (this is known as the 
constant natural capital view) [4]. 
 
Examples of manmade capital are physical 
items like cement, roads, building and 
machines. Human capital like knowledge, 




capabilities and skills are also regarded as 
manmade capital. Natural capital is taken to 
comprise physical items like naturally 
generated organic and inorganic resources as 
well as biodiversity, eco-systemic functions, 
genetic information and waste assimilation 
capacity. Natural resources are divided into 
renewables and non-renewables. Of particular 
importance is non-renewable natural capital 
since non-renewables like fossil fuels will 
become unavailable if we use it for a long 
time. Such identification and itemization of 
natural capital or resources, for A. Holland, is 
a clear indication that this approach to 
sustainability is mainly based on the needs of 
human society. Alan Holland, following Bryan 
Norton terms it as the “social scientific” 
approach [5]. Presently, we shall consider, 
first, whether these two versions of 
sustainability, the “social scientific” view, can 
provide independent justifications for the 
protection of nature and secondly, how could 
we provide such justification by providing a 
different interpretation of the Brundtland 
definition of sustainability.  
 
The theory of sustainability, according to the 
first version, says that the total capital should 
not decline and also that we should avoid 
irreversible loss. This last prescription is 
thought to provide reasons for the protection 
of natural assets since natural capital is most 
subject to irreversible loss. The question is: 
why should irreversible loss be a problem 
when overall capital does not decline? No 
additional justification is forthcoming from 
this version.  
 
The second version of sustainability has two 
variant forms. One form understands capital in 
simple physical sense and so stipulates that the 
physical stock of natural capital should not 
decline over time. This version faces certain 
problems like determining the level of physical 
stock in the area of living things since they are 
dynamically related [5]. This version might 
also be taken as prohibiting any use of non-
renewable resources. However, the most 
important aspect of this version is that one of 
the major results of following its prescriptions 
is the protection of nature: even if it fails to 
provide explicit reasons for protecting those 
aspects of nature which are not useful to 
humans. Thinkers like Holland try to retain 
this version after providing these reasons. We 
shall discuss some of these reasons and try to 
add some. The other form stipulates that what 
has to be kept constant is not the natural 
capital themselves but their economic value. 
This form requires that there should be no 
decline in the flow of services yielded by the 
stock of natural capital. This approach is 
known as “constant natural capital approach” 
which is now favoured by David Pearce and 
many other economists.  
 
However, the important debate between these 
two versions of sustainability centres on the 
extent of substitutability between natural and 
manmade capital. Generally weak 
sustainability takes it that manmade and 
natural capitals are basically substitutable 
whereas strong substitutability assumes that 
these two are mutually complementary. In his 
reply to the objection that weak sustainability 
claims infinite substitutability Wilfrid 
Beckerman affirms that weak sustainability 
allows for substitutability between different 
forms of natural and manmade capital, 
provided that, on balance, there is no decline 
in welfare. It does not assert total 
substitutability of natural and manmade 
capital.  
 
Holland thinks that both versions of the theory 
of sustainability are primarily based on the 
ideal of securing justice for present and future 
generations and hence, its prescriptions do not 
necessarily coincide with the prescription for 
the protection of nature. Holland identifies 
four arguments which attempt to show that the 
focus on preserving natural capital is implied 
by the considerations internal to a theory of 
justice espoused by the “social scientific” view 
of sustainability [5]. The advocates of this 
version argue that if we preserve assets for 
which no substitute can be found, we shall 
secure justice for future people. Similarly, if in 
the face of uncertainty we take the course of 
minimizing risks, if we eschew irreversible 
developments and if we take effective steps to 
reduce inequities, we shall secure justice for 
future people. Holland thinks that the last 
concern alone seems effective since natural 




resources are vitally linked with the 
livelihoods of the poor. As to the first 
argument it can be said that merely preserving 
the non-substitutable will not result in the 
preservation of natural capital since much 
natural capital is substitutable. Moreover, there 
are some, non-substitutable items for which no 
human interest is found. Indifference towards 
such items, hence, will not provide any reason 
for the protection of those items in nature. 
 
The second argument emphasizes the wisdom 
of preserving those features of natural 
environment about whose importance we are 
not sure. But this piece of reasoning does not 
provide any justification for the protection of 
those natural substances whose properties we 
understand and for which we have manmade 
substitutes. The third argument concerning 
irreversibility leads to an extreme form of non-
substitutability because we cannot completely 
avoid using non-renewable items. Thus, the 
prescriptions for actions to secure justice for 
all people do not necessarily involve actions 
required to secure the environmental interest in 
nature. Our environmental interest in nature is 
not fully explicable in terms of economic 
interest. 
 
Attempts have been made by economists to 
provide justification for the theory of strong 
sustainability within the framework of 
welfarist tradition. This tradition espouses a 
particular theory of human welfare which is 
based on preference utilitarianism. In this 
view, preference satisfaction is constitutive of 
human welfare or human well-being: the 
stronger the preference satisfaction, the greater 
the human welfare. In the sphere of 
preference, trade-offs are not essentially 
constrained. Substitutability between preferred 
goods is a common phenomenon.  
 
At this point a few words about substitutability 
and its acceptability are in order. Economists 
make a distinction between technical and 
economic substitutability. Any good “A” can 
be a technical substitute for another good “B” 
if “A” performs the job that “B” does. In this 
sense only a specific good alone can a 
substitute for another. However, even if a 
substitute performs the same function as the 
original good, it does not guarantee its 
acceptability. Again, a very general concept of 
economic substitutability is used in the theory 
of consumption in economics. In this sense 
two goods, for a person, are said to be 
economically substitutable if the replacement 
of one by the other does not change overall 
welfare of the person concerned. Here two 
goods are substitutable not in the sense that 
they do the same job but in the sense that the 
job done by the one is as good as the job done 
by the other. This creates the possibility of a 
wider range of substitutability. However, it can 
be asked: why one alternative is as good for a 
person as another’? The answer to this 
question depends on what account of well-
being or welfare one subscribes to [6]. 
 
The mainstream economic literature assumes a 
preference satisfaction account of well-being. 
According to this view, welfare or well-being 
consists in the satisfaction of preference. If 
two goods are equally preferred by a person, 
then one is as good as each other for that 
person. This paves the way for a wide range of 
substitutability between different goods 
because the person concerned remains 
indifferent between them. The economic 
interpretation of strong sustainability, thus, 
cannot provide reasons for the protection of 
natural assets or for the non-substitution 
spoken of in the “physical stock” interpretation 
of strong sustainability. Since the economic 
interpretation accepts the preference 
satisfaction mode of well-being, or welfare, it 
assumes that welfare is the only value in which 
all values can be measured and also that 
whatever contributes to welfare is 
exchangeable [6]. 
 
Some thinkers have rightly pointed out that the 
true basis of non-substitution, and strong 
sustainability, can be provided by the ethical 
belief in “value pluralism”. It is, as Michael 
Jacobs has put it “belief that human beings 
need a variety of different kinds of goods, 
services, experiences and relationships in order 
to achieve well-being” [7]. Thus “welfare 
function is multidimensional”. “The 
environment, it is being claimed, provides 
humankind with goods (social and cultural as 
well as individual) which are necessary for 




well-being: without them both individual lives 
and societies are impoverished, an 
impoverishment for which no substitution of 
human-made benefits can make up” [7]. Thus, 
what is required is a shift from the preference 
satisfaction model of well-being and 
sustainable development to a model that 
promotes multidimensional well-being. Multi-
dimensional well-being is often identified as 
satisfaction of those needs which enable a 
person to have a minimally flourishing life. 
The ethical basis of sustainable development is 
to be found in such interpretation of the term 
“need” used in the Brundtland definition. It 
cannot be denied that to live well we need 
particular forms of personal relationships, 
autonomy, health, knowledge of the world, a 
good relation with the non-human world, 
aesthetic experience and many others. If our 
well-being is formed by these goods, then we 
cannot say that goods are substitutable across 
different dimensions of well-being - we do not 
remain indifferent between them.  
 
Some mainstream economists, however, made 
attempts to defend natural capital by counting 
in its “existence value”. They have also 
acknowledged that we are highly averse to 
environmental losses. So, they have also 
counted loss aversion as an important 
requirement for sustainability. However, there 
are aversions and preferences which are 
considered by them as discreditable. Hence 
when they count in peoples’ aversion to 
environmental loss they can be taken as 
considering them as components of human 
welfare. This obviously involves a particular 
evaluative commitment that goes beyond the 
preference utilitarian interpretation of 
sustainability or sustainable development. In 
such counting Holland detects a “simple 
ascription of value to nature” [5]. Therefore, 
the non-substitution of natural capital can be 
accounted for if we consider the obvious fact 
that we have a special interest in natural 
environment for the direct benefits it brings to 
us. Expanding on this aspect, Holland observes 
that one of the fundamental concerns of 
sustainable development should be to maintain 
“enough of the particular historical forms of 
association and their historically particular 
components all the better if they have the mark 
of nature on them” [5]. 
 
Thus, sustainable development must be based 
on environmental sustainability, which 
includes due consideration of our 
environmental interest in nature without which 
we shall detract from the aggregate of human 
welfare. As to what should be sustained for the 
safeguard of our interest in nature, Holland 
observes: “What is handed down and 
maintained does need to remain in the process, 
something of its original form and something 
of its identity: there need to be continuities of 
form, which constitute what may be called 
“units of significance” for us, as well as 
continuities of matter [5]. Clearly, such units 
of significance, like “irreversible natural 
capital”, are non-substitutable.  
 
We cannot deny that Holland’s concept of 
“units of significance” does provide an 
important reason for the protection of natural 
assets. But this concept may attract the 
objection that it paves the way for the re-
introduction of subjective preference. 
Considered from this aspect, Bryan Norton’s 
approach, which he terms as “scientific 
contextualism” is more realistic. He avers that 
Brundtland’s reference to obligation of the 
present generation to future generations should 
not be understood in terms of individual 
satisfactions and preferences alone. He 
proposes to interpret such obligations 
holistically. He thinks that the exact nature of 
these obligations should be decided on the 
basis of scientific understanding. We must, 
first, understand the impacts anthropogenic 
activities have on their larger context. Norton 
says: “if, following Aldo Leopold’s land 
ethics, we insist that this larger context can 
only be understood as a complex ecological 
system, sustainable activities are activities that 
do not destabilize the large-scale dynamic, 
biotic and a biotic system on which future 
generations will depend. Scientific 
contextualism applies a variety of moral rules, 
placing priority on different values in different 
situations” [8]. 
 
According to Norton, contextualism is 
organicism. The biota is viewed as “a living 
system, which has an internal, self-




perpetuating organization”. Technology and 
population growth have increased human 
capability to affect adversely the systems of 
ecology or “the processes sustaining self-
organizing systems through time”. Norton’s 
contextualist approach highlights the 
commitment to protect the health and integrity 
of ecological systems. It also acknowledges 
that the self-organization of large systems 
present the context in which we have evolved. 
These systems alter more slowly than our 
culture. On the basis these considerations 
Norton provides this definition: “Sustainability 
is a relationship between dynamic human 
economic systems and larger, dynamic but 
normally slower changing ecological systems, 
such that: (a) human life can continue 
indefinitely, (b) human individuals can 
flourish, (c) human cultures can develop, but 
in which (d) effects of human activities remain 
within bounds so as not to destroy the 
health/integrity of environmental context of 
human activities” [8]. This interpretation of 
sustainability prescribes balancing of short 
time economic and long-term ecological 
concerns. Economic activities should be 
viewed as one sort of ecological activity and 







The holistic approach of “scientific 
contextualism” will be able to evaluate 
properly the place of subjective preferences of 
individuals. Hollands’s concept of the “units 
of significance” requires to be strengthened 
understanding of the integrity of 
environmental context of human activities. 
The scientific understanding of the processes 
that sustain the self-organizing larger 
ecological systems can help us effectively to 






[1] Our Common Future, World 
Commission on Environment and 
Development, Oxford University Press, 
1987, 43.  
[2] D.W. Pearce, Economic Values and the 
Natural World, Earthscan, London, 
(quoted in J. O’Neill and others), 2008, 
48. 
[3] W. Beckerman, “Sustainable 
Development”, Is it a Useful Concept?, 
Environmental Values 3(1994) 3, 191-
209. 
[4] R.K. Turner, D.W. Pearce, Sustainable 
Development: Ethics and Economics, 
SERGE, London, 1999, 5. 
[5] A. Holland, Natural Capital in 
Philosophy and the Natural 
Environment, eds.: A. Belseyand R. 
Attfield, Cambridge University Press, 
1999.  
[6] J. O’Neill, A. Holland, A. Light, 
Environmental Values, Routledge, 
London, 2008. 
[7] M Jacobs, Sustainable Development, 
Capital Substitution and Economic 
Humanity: A Response to Beckerman, 
Environmental Values 4(1995) 1, 57-68. 
[8] B. Norton, Sustainability, Human 
Welfare and Ecosystem Health, 







I would like to express my deep sense of 
gratitude to my respected supervisor, Prof. 
Ramdas Sirkar, Former Associate Professor & 
Head, Department of Philosophy, Vidyasagar 
University whose valuable and wise guidance 
helped me to complete this paper. I am 
grateful to him for his constructive 
suggestions, constant support and 
encouragement. 
 
